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The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was first 
introduced in 1923, and was passed by the Congress in 1972. In 1978, 
Congress extended the original deadline for ratification of the ERA. Thus, 
if it receives approval in the form of ratification by 38 States before June 
30, 1982, the measure will become the 27th Amendment to the Constitution, and 
will require equal treatment under Federal and State laws and practices for 
all persons, regardless of sex. While some Americans would welcome a 
constitutional guarantee of equal rights and responsibilities for persons of 
both sexes, others view the proposed amendment as a potential threat to 
family life and to the traditional roles of men and women. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution was 
first introduced 3 years after the 19th Amendment (to provide women's 
suffrage) was ratified. After being introduced in various forms in nearly 
every Congress since 1923, the ERA was approved by the 92d Congress in 1972. 
The proposed amendment provides that: 
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State 
on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two 
years after the date of ratification. 
The Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress had held hearings on 
the measure and had reported the amendment to the full House and Senate prior 
to its passage by the 92d Congress. The Senate previously had passed the 
amendment twice: in the 81st Congress on Jan. 25, 1950, and in the 83d 
Congress on July 16, 1953. On both occasions, the measure included what was 
known as the "Hayden rider," which provided that "the provisions of this 
article shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions 
now or hereafter conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." 
Proponents of the measure consistently resisted attempts to amend the ERA. 
The House of Representatives passed the Equal Rights Amendment in the 91st 
Congress on Aug. 10, 1970, after the discharge procedure was used to free the 
proposal from the Judiciary Committee. There had been no committee action on 
the ERA for 22 years prior to this action. 
When the Senate considered the measure in October 1970, it adopted two 
amendments: to exempt women from the draft and to permit recitation of 
nondenominational prayers in public schools and other public buildings. 
Supporters of the ERA were again unhappy with an amended version, and on Nov. 
19, 1970, by unanimous consent, the Senate laid aside the proposed ERA, and 
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took no further action in the 91st Congress. 
The House passed the ERA (H.J.Res. 208) I n  the 92d Congress on Oct. 12, 
1971, rejecting two committee amendments which would have: (1) added the 
words "of any personvf to Section 1 ,  and (2) added a section allowing the 
exemption of women from the draft and holding that the ERA would not impair 
the validity of any law which "reasonably promotes the health and safety of 
the people." After rejecting 10 amendments proposed by Sen. Sam Ervin, the 
Senate approved H.J.Res. 208 on Mar. 22, 1972, clearing it for ratification 
by the States. 
Three-fourths (38) of the States must ratify the ERA before it can become 
a part of the Constitution. The original deadline for ratification was Mar. 
22, 1979. The 95th Congress enacted legislation extending the deadline until 
June 30, 1982. It would take effect two years after full ratification. 
The first State to ratify, Hawaii, did so within hours of final 
congressional approval. To date, 35 States have ratified the measure, 
including Nebraska, Tennessee, Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota (where the 
Lt. Governor, acting with the power of the Governor, who was out of town, 
vetoed the rescission), which later voted to rescind ratification (see 
Chronology for dates of State ratification and rescission). 
The question of whether a State may rescind its ratification of a proposed 
amendment has never been finally resolved by either the courts or the 
Congress. Historically, most legal opinion has tended to agree with the 
Su.preme Court decision in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that 
rescission is a "political questionw) that Congress has full discretion, free 
from judicial review, to determine the validity of withdrawal of 
ratification. In the instances of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
Congress determined that withdrawal of a prior ratification was invalid, 
thereby establishing precedent for congressional non-recognition of 
rescission. However, because the action of one Congress is not binding on 
another Congress, the question remains open and is subject to discussion in 
the ratification of ERA. Legislation was introduced in the 95th Congress to 
provide that any State legislature which rescinds its ratification of a 
proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be considered to have not 
ratified the amendment. Amendments to H.J.Res. 638 to allow rescissions were 
defeated by the House and Senate. 
CONTROVERSY OVER PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Controversy over the proposed amendment relates to: (1) interpretations 
of its probable effects in some areas, ( 2 )  whether there should be room in 
the law for "reasonablew distinctions in the treatment of men and women, and 
(3) whether a constitutional amendment is the proper vehicle for improving 
the legal status of women in our Nation. 
There is little disagreement about the general intent of the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment. Legislative intent in this regard is clearly seen in 
the Senate debate on the measure in March 1972, the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committee reports on the measure, and congressional hearings h,eld 
in 1970-1971 (see Reports and Hearings). As stated in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee report on the measure, "The basic principle on which the Amendment 
rests may be stated shortly: sex should not be a factor in determining the 
legal rights of men or women.... The Amendment will affect only governmental 
action; the private actions and the private relationships of men and women 
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are unaffected." 
The Equal Rights Amendment would require that governments treat each 
person, male or female, as a citizen and individual under the law. It is 
directed at eliminating gender-based classifications in the law which 
specifically deny equality of rights or violate the principle of 
nondiscrimination with regard to sex. Thus every Federal or State law which 
makes a discriminatory distinction between men and women would be invalid 
under the Equal Rights Amendment. Both proponents and opponents of the 
amendment agree that proper interpretation of the ERA would result in the 
elimination of the use of sex as the sole factor in determining, for example, 
who would be subj.ect to the military draft, if one were reinstated; who in a 
divorce action would be awarded custody of a child; who would have 
responsibility for family support; or who would be subject to jury duty. 
Public schools could not require higher admissions standards for persons of 
one sex than for the other; courts could not impose longer jail sentences on 
convicted criminals of one sex. Thus certain responsibilities and 
protections which have been or are now extended to members of one sex, but 
not to members of the other sex, would have to be either extended to everyone 
or eliminated entirely. 
Although there is general agreement on the intent of the amendment, one 
issue of interpretation on which opinions still are divided is whether the 
existence of separate restrooms, prisons, and dormitories for males and 
females would be permissible under provisions of the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment. One point of view is that the constitutional right of privacy 
established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), would permit a separation of the sexes with respect to such places as 
public restrooms and sleeping quarters. The opposing view is that the most 
recent constitutional amendment takes precedence over all other sections of 
the constitution with which it is inconsistent, and to allow separate 
facilities would be to revive the "separate but equal" doctrine. Opponents 
of the amendment also express concern that the Court has not yet clearly 
defined the rights of privacy and that therefore it is impossible to 
ascertain how this principle would be applied under the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Proponents have argued that the existence of separate restrooms 
in no way discriminates on the basis of sex and does not violate the 
equality-of-rights principle which underlies the Equal Rights Amendment. 
A second disagreement concerns whether it is in the interest of the 
Nation, or of the women of the Nation, to establish .absolute, unequivocal 
equality of treatment for men and women under the law. There are some who 
believe that because of unique characteristics or traditional societal roles, 
women should receive different legal treatment than men. The opposing view 
is that all citizens should share equally the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship under the law. 
This basic conflict leads to the third major area of disagreement: whether 
the process of constitutional amendment is the best means to improve the 
legal status of women in the United States. One point of view is that a 
ConStitUtiOnal amendment is unnecessary because the equal protection clause 
of the 14th Amendment, if properly interpreted', would nullify every law 
lacking a rational basis which makes distinctions based on sex. This idea is 
closely allied with the view that. men and women should not always receive 
absolutely equal legal treatment. The approach of relying on the 14th 
Amendment appears to offer more flexibility of interpretation than does the 
proposed Equal Rights Amendment, which forbids any sex-based classification. 
Those who hold this view also point to the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. 
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Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as a strong indication that the Court would find 
sex-based discrimination to be in violation of the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Reed case, the Supreme Court ruled as 
UnCOn~titUtiOnal an Idaho statute requiring preference of male relatives over 
female relatives as administrators of estates. The Reed decision represented 
the first time the Supreme Court had struck down a law which discriminated 
against women. 
Since Reed, several other cases have struck down gender classifications: 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), concerning military benefits in 
which four Justices argued that sex should be ruled a "suspect 
Classification," three argued that the Court should not make such a 
determination, one rejected the idea outright, and the ninth took no position 
on the matter; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), concerning jury 
selection; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) , concerning Social 
Security benefits for widowed fathers; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), 
concerning the age of majority; Craig et al. v. Boren, Governor of Oklahoma, 
et al., 429 U.S. 190 (1976), concerning the age of majority in the sale of 
3.2% beer, and Califano v. Goldfarb, - - U.S. - , 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (Mar. 2, 
19771, concerning social security benefits for widowers. 
On the other hand, several recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld 
gender classifications which discriminated against men and in favor of women, 
on the ground that they are intended to overcome historic discrimination 
against. women. For example: Kahn v. S.hevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), regarding 
tax exemptions benefitting widows; and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
(1975), which involved promotion systems in the Navy. 
Because gender classifications have not been struck down with consistency 
in recent Supreme Court decisions, supporters of a constitutional amendment 
argue that there is a need for the establishment of a clear rule that gender 
classifications are suspect and that they must be justified by showing a 
compelling interest in order to be sustained. To date, the Court has not 
held that sex discrimination is "suspect" under the equal protection. clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus leaving the burden of proof on a 
complaining woman that a sex-based classification is "unreasonable." 
CONTROVERSY OVER EXTENSION OF THE RATIFICATION DEADLINE 
Three basic questions arose during consideration of extending the 
ratification deadline for the proposed Equal Rights Amendment: (1) does 
Congress have the power to extend the deadline; (2) if Congress has such 
authority, should it extend the ratification deadline; and (3) if Congress 
chose to extend the deadline, by what legislative method would the extension 
have to be enacted. 
The first question regarding congressional authority to extend the 
deadline for ratification had never been addressed specifically by earlier 
Congresses or the courts. Article V of the Constitution sets forth the 
method of amending the Constitution; however, it does not mention any time 
limits for ratification of a proposed amendment. The Supreme Court in Dillon 
v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), held that under Article V of the Constitution, 
Congress, in proposing an amendment, may fix a reasonable time for 
ratification. Beginning with the 18th Amendment and continuing until the 
23rd, except for the 19th Amendment (the Woman's Suffrage Amendment) for 
which no time limit was set, 7-year limits were included in the substantive 
provisions of amendments. Then, beginning with the 23rd Amendment, time 
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limits were included as a part df the resolving clause of the underlying 
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment, as is the case of the 
proposed Equal Rights Amendment. Therefore, there is no disagreement that 
the Congress has the power to set a reasonable time limit for ratification of 
a proposed amendment. 
With respect to the actual time limit set for ratification of a proposed 
amendment, the Supreme Court has held that seven years is reasonable (Dillon 
v. Gloss) and the Congress can make the final determination, with respect to 
an amendment which originally had no time limit, on the reasonableness of the 
time within which a sufficient number of States must act (Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433 (1939)). For example, since 1900 only one amendment, the 
proposed child-labor amendment submitted in June 1924, has not been ratified 
by the requisite number of States. Since this proposed amendment had no time 
limit, it is still pending before the States. If this proposed amendment 
were ratified by the requisite number of States, it would then be up to the 
Congress to decide if its ratification were completed within a reasonable 
amount of time. 
With reference to the proposed ERA the question was whether Congress, once 
it has set a time limit, could extend that time period. The Coleman decision 
was used by both opponents and proponents of the extension. Opponents said 
that a succeeding Congress can determine the validity of the time period only 
when no time limit has been set by the proposing Congress. Proponents said 
that since the Court held that a subsequent Congress can determine the 
reasonableness of the time within which a sufficient number of States must 
act when no time limit for ratification has been set, a subsequent Congress 
can also determine the validity of the reasonableness of a time limit set by 
the proposing Congress. 
Opponents of the extension also argued that the only role for the Congress 
in the amendment process is that of proposing amendments and, then, perhaps 
decidlng on ratification if no time limit is set. Congress, therefore, has 
no authority to interfere with the ratification process once begun. Another 
argument was that the States when ratifying relied on the 7-year deadline and 
it would be unfair to these States to change the time limit. 
Proponents of the extension argued, that according to the Dillon and 
Coleman decisions, the Congress has the authority to establish a reasonable 
time for ratification and therefore may extend the period if the extension is 
for a reasonable time. They further argued that the time period was in the 
resolving clause and not the amendment submitted to the States, therefore, it 
is a matter of detail, not substance, and is under the exclusive purview of 
the Congress. 
Has a reasonable period of time been given to ratification of the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment or should the Congress extend the deadline? 
Opponents of the extension stated that a reasonable time has been given 
for ratification. They argued that the purpose of the reasonable time rule 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Dillon was that there be a 
contemporaneous consensus; that is, all the ratifications of the several 
States should have occurred sufficiently close together to reflect a 
consensus of three-fourths of the several States at a given point in time. 
Opponents pointed out that 30 States ratified the ERA during the first year. 
Three additional States ratified the amendment in 1974, one in 1975 and one 
in January 1977. They argued that now the trend is against ratification as 
four States have rescinded their prior ratifications. They pointed out that 
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every State legislature has considered ERA and worked its will according to 
its constitutional processes. In the 15 unratified States, 24 committee 
votes and 59 floor votes have taken place since the proposed amendment was 
submitted to the States for ratification. Opponents argue that in this day 
of mass communications seven years is a'more than reasonable period of time. 
Further they argued that it is unfair "to change the rules in the middle of 
the game." 
Proponents of the extension stated that the 92nd Congress set the 7-year 
time limit because that had been the traditional time period set on 
amendments proposed since 1917, with the 18th Amendment (except for the 
woman's suffrage amendment, which set no, time limit). Regarding the 
contemporaneous consensus, proponents argued that there is no contemporaneous 
consensus on the issues raised by the 14th Amendment because the debate is 
still going on. Likewise, there is no contemporaneo.us consensus on the 
issues raised by the ERA nor is there likely to be. They further argued that 
it took nearly 50 years to get the ERA passed by Congress and will probably 
take at least another 50 years for the Amendment's full impact to be felt. 
Proponents argued that public opinion polls continue to reflect the belief of 
a majority of Americans that the ERA should be ratified. They further argue 
that ERA has not been fully heard in some States. For example, in one State 
ERA has never come to the floor of either house. In four States, only one 
house has voted on ERA. In others ERA has been held up in committee. At 
least seven States have enacted rules requiring more than a simple majority 
for the ratification of a constitutional amendment. [ ~ l a b a m a  -- three-fifths 
in the House; Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho and Kansas -- two-thirds in 
both Houses; and Illinois -- three-fifths in both Houses.] Proponents argued 
that a time limit can not be set on human equality. 
If the ERA had not been ratified by Mar. 22, 1979, some observers felt 
that several options remained open for the passage and ratification of an 
Equal Rights Amendment. If an extension not passed the Congress, one 
alternative was to seek the enactment of a new amendment. Some opponents of 
the extension urged the Congress to defeat the extension and, after the time 
limit expired, pass a revised versio'n of the ERA more acceptable to the 
States. 
Another issue discussed in relation to extension is whether States should 
be statutorily allowed by such legislation to rescind their prior 
ratification of a proposed amendment. The Supreme Court has said that 
rescission is a political matter for the Congress to decide. (Coleman v. 
Miller) One question is when should the Congress decide that issue with 
respect to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. Some argued that since 
rescission is a separate issue, the time to make the decision on whether a 
State can rescind its ratification is when the requisite number of States 
have ratified. The Congress has made such determinations with respect to the 
14th and 15th Amendments. Others argued that it would be unfair to extend 
the time for ratification without allowing States to rescind their prior 
ratifications. In other words, a State legislature's vote to ratify would be 
considered irreversable within the ratification time period, but a comparable 
vote against ratification or the rescission of an earlier ratification could 
be reversed by subsequent action. Amendments to H.J.Res. 638 to allow 
rescission were defeated in both the House and Senate. 
At the time Congress chose to extend the deadline, what legislative method 
should have been used? 
Several possible methods were available to the Congress for extending the 
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ratification deadline. Those who supported the concurrent resolution, 
requiring only a majority vote, argued that the Constitution identifies 
issues as requiring a two-thirds vote. With respect to the constitutional 
amendment process, only the substance of proposed amendments to the 
Constitution require a two-thirds vote, as opposed to other parts of the 
amending process requiring a simple majority vote. For example, Congress, 
when deciding whether the necessary three-fourths of the States had ratified 
the 14th Amendment, used the concurrent resolution to express the 
congressional view. An argument raised against a concurrent resolution was 
that it does not have the force of law and therefore was not binding on a 
subsequent Congress. 
Others argued that a joint resolution requiring a two-thirds vote is 
necessary since the ERA was originally proposed and passed by a joint 
resolution. They argued that many Members of Congress may have voted for the 
Amendment because of the time limit and it would be unfair to change that 
time limit by a simple majority. Another argument for a joint resolution was 
that it would have the force of law. An argument against the necessity for a 
two-thirds vote was that extending the deadline is a matter of detail and not 
substance; therefore, requiring only a majority vote. 
A third proposal was to pass a joint resolution by a majority vote 
requiring the President's signature. This method, like the two-thirds vote 
on a joint r e ~ o l ~ t i o n ,  would have the effect of law. An argument for this 
approach was that if the Congress wanted to change the time limit when the 
ERA was being considered by the 92nd Congress, such a change would have 
required only a majority vote and, therefore, it should only require a 
majority Vote now. Those who argued against this method say that it is a 
dangerous precedent to involve the executive- branch in the process of 
amending the Constitution of the United States. 
H.J.Res. 638 passed both the House and Senate by majority votes. H.J.Res. 
638 was signed by the President on Oct. 2 0 ,  1978, although there is still a 
question as to whether his signature is necessary. 
RATIFICATION HISTORY 
Although the Equal Rights Amendment was ratified by 35 States out of the 
requisite 38, no States ratified the Amendment after January 1977. The 
extension of the ratification period provided by H.J.Res. 638 ended on June 
3 0 , 1 9 8 2 ,  and the proposed amendment, still three States short, died 
automatically on that date. 
LEGAL CHALLENGES 
A ruling on Dec. 23, 1981, by the U.S. District Court for Idaho raised 
substantial questions about the amendment's legal status with regard to the 
issues of rescission and extension. In Idaho v. Freeman, Civil No. 79-1097 
(D. Idaho, Dec. 23, 1981), Judge Marion J. Callister ruled that individual 
States were not bound by their original votes to ratify the amendment, but 
might rescind at any point before three-fourths of the States vote to to 
ratify. Five State legislatures, Nebraska, Tennessee, Idaho, Kentucky, and 
South Dakota, have reversed their approval of the amendment. "Rescission," 
said Judge Callister, is "clearly a proper exercise of a State's power 
.... [ . ] "  (Idaho v. Freeman, Slip Opinion at p. 62.) "Congress has no power 
to determine the validity or invalidity of a properly certified ratification 
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or rescission," (Ibid, p. 71) 
The district court also said that Congress violated the Constitution when 
it extended the deadline for the proposed amendment. In his decision, Judge 
Callister wrote that "[a]s part of the mode of ratification Congress may, by 
a two-thirds vote of both Houses, set a reasonable time limit for the States 
to act in order for the ratification to be effective. When [such a limit] is 
set, it is binding on Congress and the States and it cannot be changed by 
Congress thereafter." (Ibid, p. 71.) In addition, the Court said that even 
if Congress had the power to extend the time limit, it could not do so by a 
simple majority vote, as it did in 1978, since extension would require the 
same two-thirds majority in both Houses as required by Article V of the 
Constitution for proposal of an amendment. 
However, on Jan. 25, 1982, the Supreme Court stayed the Idaho court 
decision in its entirety, thus clearing the amendment's legal status (pending 
a hearing by the Court at a later date). 
LEGISLATION 
H.J.Res. 208, 92d Congress (Griffiths) 
Constitutional Amendment. Provides that equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex. Passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 354-24 on 
Oct. 12, 1971, and passed the Senate on Mar. 22, 1972, by a vote of 84-8. 
The amendment must be ratified by three-fourths (38) of the States within 7 
years from the date of final approval by the Congress. 
H.J.Res. 638, 95th Congress (Holtzman et al.) 
Extends the deadline for ratification of the proposed Equal Rights 
Ameridment until June 30, 1982. Passed the House on Aug. 15, 1978, by a vote 
of 233 to 189 and passed the Senate on Oct. 6 ,  1978, by a vote of 60 to 36. 
Signed by the President on Oct. 20, 1978. 
H.J.Res. 192, 97th Congress (Kindness) 
Constitutional Amendment. Declares that equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account 
of sex. Introduced Feb. 25, 1981; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. 
HEARINGS 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights. Equal Rights Amendment 
extension. 
Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions, on H.J:Res. 638. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 378 p. 
Hearings held Nov. 1, 4 ,  and 8, 1977; and May 17-19, 1978. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee 
on Constitution. Extension of the deadline for ratification 
of the Equal Rights Amendment. Hearings, 95th Congress, 
2d session. (Printed hearings not yet available.) 
Hearings held Aug. 2-4, 1978. 
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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee 
No. 4. Equal rights for men and women, 1971. Hearings, 
926 Congress, 1st session, on H.J.Res. 35, 208, and related 
bills; and H.R. 916 and related bills. Mar. 24, 25, and 31; 
Apr. 1, 2, and 5 ,  1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., . 
1971. 724 p. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Equal rights, 
1970. Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d session, on S.J.Res. 61 and 
S.J.Res. 231. Sept. 9, 10, 11, and 15, 1970. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 433 p. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments. The "equal rightsqq amendment. 
Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d session, on S.J.Res. 61. May 5 ,  6 
and 7, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 793 p. 
REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Equal rights 
for men and women; report together with individual views to 
accompany H.J.Res. 208. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 
16 p. (92d Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 92-359) 
----- Proposed equal rights amendment extension; report to accompany 
H.J.Res. 638. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978.. 
64 p. (95th Congress, 2d session. House Report no. 95-1405). 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Equal rights 
for men and women; report together with individual views to 
accompany S.J.Res. 9, and H.J.Res. 208. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1972. 52 p. (92d Congress, 2d session. Senate. 
Report no. 92-689) 
OTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 



























South Dakota (voted to rescind 03/01/79) 
01/26/73 -- Wyoming 
11/13/72 -- California 
09/27/72 -- Pennsylvania 
06/26/72 -- Kentucky (voted to rescind 03/16/78) 
06/21/72 -- Massachusetts 
05/26/72 -- Maryland 
05/22/72 -- Michigan 
05/18/72 -- New York 
04/26/72 -- Wisconsin 
04/22/72 -- West Virginia 
04/21/72 -- Colorado 
04/17/72 -- New Jersey 
04/14/72 -- Rhode Island 
04/05/72 -- Alaska 
04/04/72 -- Tennessee (voted to rescind 04/23/74) 
03/30/72 -- Texas 
03/29/72 -- Nebraska (voted to rescind 03/15/73) 
03/28/72 -- Kansas 
03/24/72 -- Idaho (voted to rescind 02/08/77) 
03/24/72 -- Iowa 
03/23/72 -- Delaware 
03/23/72 -- New Hampshire 
03/22/72 -- Hawaii 
The following 15 State legislatures have not ratified the Equal 
Rights Amendment: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. 
The following 16 States have equal rights provisions in their 
constitutions: 
Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 





Senate - rejected, 06/12/73, 26-6; rejected, 01/31/78 
24-8. 
House - ratified, 03/24/72, 38-2. Senate - ratified, 
04/05/72, 16-2. 
House - rejected in committee, 02/22/73; rejected in 
committee 03/07/74, 7-5; rejected in House 02/25/75, 
41-19. Senate - rejected in committee, 03/05/73; 
rejected in committee 04/01/74, 5-4; rejected in Senate 
02/13/75, 16-14; approved on 1st reading 02/26/76, 
16-14; rejected on 2nd reading 03/01/76, 15-15; 
rejected in Senate, 05/05/77, 18-11; rejected 
by passing amended version striking section 2, 
04/11/78, 17-13. 
Senate - rejected by passing amended version 02/01/73, 
20-14. House - approved a "do passn recommendation 
in committee, 02/16/77, voice vote; approved a "do 
not pass" recommendation in committee, 03/14/79, 
by a vote of 14-4. 
CALIFORNIA: Senate - ratified, 11/09/72, 29-9. House - ratified, 
11/13/72, 54-16. 
COLORADO: House - ratified, 04/13/72, 61-0. Senate - ratified, 
04/21/72, 30-1. 
CONNECTICUT: House - rejected, 04/06/72, 83-77; ratified, 03/08/73, 
99-47. Senate - ratified, 03/15/73, 27-9. 







House - ratified, 03/24/72, 91-4; rejected, 04/17/73, 
64-54; ratified, 04/10/75, 62-58; ratified, 
05/17/79, 66-53; ratified, 06/21/82, 
60-58. Senate - rejected in 
committee, 04/04/73, 3-3; rejected in Senate, 04/10/74, 
21-19; rejected, 04/25/75, 21-17; rejected, 
04/13/77, 21-19; rejected in committee, 
04/04/79, 12-4; rejected, 05/24/79, 19-21; 
rejected, 06/21/.82, 22-16. 
House - rejected in committee, 02/19/73, 9-2; rejected 
in House, 01/28/74, 104-70; rejected in House, 
01/25/82, 116-57. Senate - rejected, 02/17/75, 
33-22; rejected in committee, 01/12/78, unanimously; 
rejected, 01/21/80, 32-23; rejected in House, 
01/27/82, 116-57. 
House - ratified, 03/22/72, 51-0. Senate - ratified, 
03/22/72, 25-0. 
House - ratified, 03/24/72, 59-5; rescission defeated 
02/13/74, 35-35; rescinded, 02/04/77, 44-22. 
Senate - ratified, 03/24/72, 31-4; rescinded, 1974, 2 
dissenting votes; rescinded, 02/08/77, 18-17. 
Senate - ratified, 05/00/72, 30-21; rejected in 
committee, 04/04/73, 14-7; rejected, 06/18/74, 
30-24 as three-fifths majority is necessary 
for ratification in Illinois; Senate voted to 
retain the rule requiring a three-fifths vote 
to ratify a constitutional amendment, 03/05/75; 
Senate voted not to discharge measure from committee, 
06/17/75, 30-28; rejected, 12/16/76, 29-22, as 
three-fifths majority is necessary for ratification 
Illinois. House - rejected 05/16/72, 75-68, rejected, 
06/30/72, 82-76; rejected, 04/04/73, 95-72; 
ratified, 05/01/75, 113-62; rejected a motion 
to change the three-fifths majority necessary 
to ratify a constitutional amendment to a 
simple majority, 03/09/77, 100-66; rejected, 
06/02/77, 101-74, as 107 votes were needed to 







votes were needed for ratification; rejected 
06/22/78, 105-71, as 107 votes were needed for 
ratification; rejected, 06/18/80, 102-71; 
rejected 06/22/82, 103-72, as 107 Votes 
were needed for ratification. 
House - ratified, 02/14/73, 53-45; ratified, 01/24/75, 
61-39; ratified, 01/12/77, 54-45. Senate - rejected, 
04/02/73, 34-16; rejected in committee, 02/13/75, 8-5; 
ratified, 01/18/77, 26-24. 
House - ratified, 03/24/72, 73-14. Senate - ratified, 
03/24/72, 44-1. 
House - ratified, 03/28/72, 86-37; rejected 
rescission, 02/24/77, 66-56. Senate - ratified, 
03/28/72, 34-5. 
House - ratified, 06/12/72, 56-31; voted to rescind, 
02/18/76, 57-40; voted to rescind, 03/16/78, 61-28. 
Senate -- ratified, 06/15/72, 20-18; voted to 
rescind, 03/14/78, 23-15. 03/20/78 -- the 
Lieutenant Governor, acting with the power of the 
Governor who as out of town, vetoed the rescission 
of Kentucky's ratification of ERA. 
Senate - ratified, 06/07/72, 25-13; approved an amended 
version of ERA, 01/22/75, 21-16. House - rejected, 
06/29/72, 64-32; rejected in committee, 06/19/74, 
10-7; rejected in committee, 06/11/75, 8-7; rejected in 
committee, 06/16/76, 10-6; rejected in committee, 
06/07/77, 11-5; rejected in committee, 06/11/79, 11-5. 
House - ratified, 02/27/73, 74-72; ratified, 01/17/74, 
78-68. Senate - rejected, 03/08/73, 16-15; ratified, 
01/18/74, 19-11. 
MARYLAND: House - ratified, 03/24/72, 86-32. Senate - ratified, 
03/31/72, unanimous. 
MASSACHUSETTS: Senate - ratified, 06/19/72, voice vote. 
House - ratified, 06/21/72, 205-7. 
MICHIGAN: House - ratified, 05/18/72, 90-18. Senate - ratified, 
05/22/72, voice vote. 
MINNESOTA: House - ratified, 01/17/73, 104-28. Senate - ratified, 
02/08/73, 48-18. 
MISSISSIPPI: Senate - rejected in Senate Committee, 02/08/73, 7-2; 
rejected in committee, 03/09/76, 4-3; rejected in 
committee 01/28/77, 5-4. 
MISSOURI : Senate - rejected in committee, 02/06/73, 7-3; rejected 
in Senate, 06/02/75, 20-14; rejected, 03/15/77, 22-12. 
















House - ratified, 01/18/73, 73-23. Senate - rejected, 
02/02/73, 25-2; ratified, 01/11/74, 35-14; 
rejected rescission, 02/09/77, 25-25. 
Unicameral legislature - ratified, 03/23/72, 38-0; 
rescinded, 03/15/73, 31-17; rejected ratification, 
02/04/75, 25-25. 
Senate - rejected, 03/01/73, 16-4; rejected, 02/19/75, 
12-8; ratified, 02/08/77, 11-10; defeated, 
01/16/79, 14-3. House - ratified, 
02/17/75, 27-13; rejected, 02/11/77, 24-15. 
House - ratified, 03/23/72, 179-81. Senate - ratified, 
03/23/72, 21-0. 
House - ratified, 04/17/72, 62-4. Senate - ratified, 
04/17/72, 34-0. 
House - ratified, 02/13/73, 40-22. Senate - ratified, 
02/13/73, 33-8. 
Senate - ratified, 04/20/72, 51-4. House - ratified, 
05/03/72, 117-25. 
Senate - reject-ed, 03/01/73, 27-24; rejected, 
03/01/77, 26-24; rejected in committee 
02/16/79; motion to table 06/04/82, 27-23. 
House - rejected in 
committee, 01/21/74, 10-6; approved on first reading, 
04/15/75, 60-58; 'rejected on second reading, 04/16/75, 
62-57; ratified, 02/09/77, 61-55. 
Senate - ratified, 02/07/73, 30-20; ratified, 01/24/75, 
28-22; -rejected rescission, 02/17/77, 32-18. 
House - rejected, 02/23/73, 51-49; ratified, 
02/03/75, 52-49. 
House - ratified, 03/28/73, 54-40. Senate - rejected 
in committee, 04/22/73, 6-3; rejected in committee, 
05/08/73, 5-4; ratified, 02/07/74, 20-12. 
Senate - ratified, 03/23/72, voice vote. 
House - rejected, 03/29/72, 52-36; rejected, 
02/01/73, 53-45; rejected a "do pass" 
motion, 01/21/75, 51-45; rejected a "report 
progress" motion, 01/21/75, 51-45; approved a "do not 
pass'' motion, 01/21/75, 50-43; referred back to second 
House Committee, 03/15/77. 
Senate - ratified, 02/01/73, 23-6; reaffirmed their 
ratification, 02/22/77, 48-14. House - ratified, 
02/08/73, 50-9. 
House - ratified, 05/02/72, 178-3. Senate - ratified, 
09/20/72, 43-3. 
Senate - ratified, 04/04/72, 39-11. House - ratified, 
SOUTH CAROLINA: House - ratified, 03/22/72, 83-0; rejected, 04/26/73, 
62-44; rejected on a motion to table, 03/26/75, 
46-43. Senate - rejected on motion to table, 
02/07/78, 23-18. 
SOUTH DAKOTA: Senate - ratified, 01/29/73, 22-13; rejected 
rescission, 03/08/77. House - ratified, 02/02/73, 
43-27. 03/01/79, Senate concurred with House 
in holding prior ratification of ERA null and 






House - ratified, 03/23/72, 70-0; rescinded, 04/23/74, 
56-33. Senate - ratified, 04/04/72, 25-5; rescinded, 
03/19/74, 17-11. 
Senate - ratified, 03/29/72, unanimously. 
House - ratified, 03/30/72, 137-9. 
House - rejected, 01/24/73, 51-20; rejected, 02/18/75, 
54-21. 
House - rejected, 1972, 69-67; ratified, 01/12/73, 
120-.28. Senate - ratified, 02/21/73, 19-8. 
House - rejected in committee, 02/06/73, 13-2; rejected 
in committee, 02/27/74, 02/27/74, 12-8; House failed in 
effort to change rules, 01/21/77, 62-46; rejected 
in committee, 02/09/78, 12-8. 
Senate - rejected in committee, 02/28/74, 10-5; 
approved in committee, 01/17/75, 6-5; rejected in 
Senate, 01/21/75, 21-19; rejected in committee, 
01/23/75, 8-7; rejected in committee, 02/04/76, 
8-7; rejected in Senate, 01/27/77, 20-18 as 
21 votes were necessary for ratification; Senate 
Privileges and Elections Committee voted 
8-7 against a proposal to ratify; Senate rejected, 
02/12/80, 19-20 (21 votes necessary to ratify); 
Senate rejected, 02/'17/82, 19-20. 
WASHINGTON: House - ratified, 03/09/73, 76-21. Senate - ratified, 
03/22/73, 29-19. 
WEST VIRGINIA: Senate - ratified, 04/21/72, 31-0; rescission 
defeated, 02/26/74, 18-15. House - ratified, 04/22/72, 
unrecorded vote. 
WISCONSIN: House - ratified, 04/19/72, 81-11. Senate - ratified, 
O4/2O/72, 29-4. 
WYOMING: House - ratified, 01/15/73, 41-20. Senate - ratified, 
01/24/73, 17-12; defeated rescission, 01/22/77, 
16-14. 
CHRONOLOGY 
10/20/78 -- H.J.Res. 638 signed by the President. 
10/06/78 -- H.J.Res. 638 passed the Senate by a vote of 60-36. 
08/15/78 -- H.J.Res. 638, as amended by the Committee on the Judiciary 
to extend'the ratification deadline until June 30, 1982, 
passed the House by a vote of 233-189. 
08/04/78 -- Hearings held by Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on S.J.Res. 134. 
08/03/78 -- Hearings held by the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on S.J.Res. 134. 
08/02/78 -- Hearings held by the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on S.J.Res. 134. 
07/18/78 -- House Committee on the Judiciary reported H.J.Res. 638 
with an amendment to extend the ratification deadline 
until June 30, 1982. 
05/17/78 - 05/19/78 -- Hearings on H.J.Res. 638 held by 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. 
11/08/77 -- Third day of hearings held by the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights on H.J. Res. 638. 
11/04/77 -- Second day of hearings held by the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights on H.J. Res. 638. 
11/01/77 -- First day of hearings held by the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional'Rights on H.J.Res. 638. 
10/26/77 -- H.J. Res. 638 introduced to extend the deadline for 
ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 
03/22/72 -- The Senate passed H.J.Res. 208 by a vote of 84 to 8. 
10/12/71 -- The House passed H.J.Res. 208 by a vote of 354 to 24. 
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